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Low-INCOME WOMEN OF TEXAS V. BOST,

38 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
FACTS
In 1965, Congress enacted Title XIX of the Social Security Act.' The
federal government developed obligatory and elective medical services that a
state should or could (respectively) offer to its citizens under Medicaid.2 The
Hyde Amendment to the Medicaid Act provides that no federal reimbursement
funds may be used for state-funded abortion services unless such abortions are
performed in cases of rape, incest or situations where the mother suffers from
a physical ailment "caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, that would,
as certified by a physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an
abortion is performed." 3 Although the Hyde Amendment prohibits the federal
government from funding certain abortions, states are free to use state funds
to finance abortions.4
The state of Texas has participated in the Medicaid program since 1967
when it established the Medical Assistance Program.' Texas adopted the Hyde
Amendment restrictions on state-funded abortion services.' As a result, the
Low-Income Women of Texas,7 commenced this suit challenging Texas'
monetary limitations on abortions provided by the state to poor woman.'
Texas' monetary limitations on state-funded abortions allow physicians to use
state funds only for abortions performed according to the parameters of the
Hyde Amendment. 9 Abortions falling outside the scope of the Hyde
Amendment must be performed at the expense of the state or the patient. " The
difference between state-funded abortion services and all other state-funded
medical services is that state-funded abortion services require a compounded
showing of medical necessity, rather than the standard showing of necessity."
Both plaintiff and defendant filed summary judgment motions.' 2 The

1. Low-Income Women of Tex. v. Bost, 38 S.W.3d 689,692 (Tx. Ct.App. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1396-1396v (West 1942 Supp. 2000). Explaining that Title XIX of the Social Security Act instituted

the federal Medicaid program that appropriates federal funds to each state that provides medical services
to a variety of categories of needy individuals. The government pays a portion of the aggregate costs that
a state expends in supplying these medical services.
2. Low-Income Women of Tex., 38 S.W.3d at 692.
3. Id.
at 692.
4.
5.
6.
7.
to indigent
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Jd. at 693.
Id.
Id. at 692. The low-income women are represented by doctors who provide abortion services
women in Texas.
Jd.at 691.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 691.
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District Court of Travis County, 126th District, granted summary judgment to
Texas.13 Plaintiffs then appealed alleging that Texas' abortion-funding
restrictions violate plaintiffs' equal protection rights, privacy guarantees and
the equal rights amendments under the Texas constitution. 4
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals of Texas reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant. The Court of Appeals held that the Texas
constitution's Equal Rights Amendment ("Texas ERA") raised sex "to a
suspect classification," therefore subjecting any facially gender discriminatory
statute to strict judicial scrutiny. 5 Because Texas could not establish that its
adoption of the Hyde Amendment supported any compelling state interest, the
court ruled that Texas' application of the Hyde
Amendment to state-funded
6
abortion services violated the Texas ERA.1
ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals of Texas began its discussion with a brief analysis
of the parties' summary judgment motions 7 and proceeded to dismiss
plaintiffs' claim regarding the unconstitutionality ofthe Maternal/Infant Health
Act for lack of ripeness. 8 The court addressed only the issue of whether the
state's placement of the Hyde Amendment limitation on state funded abortions
violated the Texas constitution.' 9
As it delved into the state constitutional issue, the court noted that this case
was not about a woman's right to state-funded abortion services, but rather the
case was about the application of a different medical necessity standard to
abortion services as opposed to all other medical services.20 The court warned
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 698.
16. Id. at 700.

17. Id.at 695.
18. Id. The court dismissed this claim because the state had not funded the maternal/infant health
act since 1991 and plaintiffs made no showing that Texas would start in the imminent future.
19. Id. at 693 - 695 (explaining that the Hyde Amendment essentially prohibits spending federal
funds for abortions for indigent women except in cases of rape or incest or if"a life-endangering physical
condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, that would, as certified by a physician, place the
woman in danger of death unless an abortion is-performed." Texas' application of the Hyde Amendment
to state funded abortions requires that a pregnant women's life be in imminent danger in order for her to
receive state funding for the abortion she seeks. It is not merely enough for a doctor to determine that a
woman needs an abortion to maintain her health or to prevent her feeble health from getting even worse;
rather the unwanted pregnancy must place the woman's life in imminent, mortal danger.).
20. Id.
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that this case only involved the issue of "funding medically necessary
abortions" and did not and would not concern the morality of abortion."'
The court explained that to prevail on their unconstitutionality claim, the
low-income women would have to prove that the Texas constitution offers
more comprehensive protection "of [their] individual rights" than the United
States constitution.22 The Supreme Court has held that the Hyde Amendment,
as it is applied in the federal realm, is neither a violation of a woman's
constitutional right to have an abortion, nor a violation of a woman's First
Amendment or Fifth Amendment protections.23
Before the court addressed plaintiffs' Texas ERA claim, it noted that
plaintiffs may possess valid claims under the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses of the Texas constitution.24 The court pointed out that Texas
courts, like several other state courts, have interpreted the Texas constitution
to include broader protections than the U.S. Constitution.2 5 However, the court
refused to explore this possibility because the court could resolve the issue of
this case by simply addressing the Texas ERA.26
The court examined the significance of the addition of the ERA to the
Texas constitution, a document which already contained equal protection and
due process clauses. 27 The court concluded that the Texas ERA affords people
an even broader protection of their individual liberties than the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Texas constitution and the U.S.2"
true the Texas ERA in a light akin to that of the existing equal protection and
due process clauses 29in the Texas constitution would render the words of the
Texas ERA useless.
The court stated that the Texas ERA "elevates sex along with race, color,
creed and national origin-to a suspect classification."30 This suspect
classification demands that the court employ a strict scrutiny standard to
determine whether a statute unfairly discriminates against a protected class of
persons.3 1 Thus, a statute that classifies individuals and individuals' rights on
21. Id.
22. Id.at 696.
23. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which merely protects a woman from undue
interference with her right to have an abortion before her unwanted fetus becomes viable).
24. Id.
25. ld.at 697.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing In re Mclean, 725 S.W.2d 696,697-98 (TEX. 1987) (holding that to construe the Texas
ERA to be only as protective as the U.S. Constitution and Texas constitution would render the Texas ERA
hollow and pointless)).
30. Id. (citing Mercer v. Board of Truestees, 538 S.W.2d 201, 206 (TEX. Ov.APP. 1976) (holding
that a statute that discriminates solely on the basis of sex violates the Texas ERA)).
31. Id.

92
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the basis of sex violates the Texas ERA unless the state establishes that the
"classification is somehow required by the unique physical characteristics of
the sexes. 32 If the particular makeup of the sexes genuinely necessitates
unequal treatment of the sexes, then the state must present a rational basis for
the statute.33 If the state does not or cannot demonstrate a rational basis
justification for the statute, then the state must prove that enactment of the
statute is
the least limiting method available to protect a compelling state
34
interest.
The court rejected Texas' initial argument asserting that Texas
discriminates against no one since Texas "refuses to fund medically necessary
abortions for all indigent citizens, regardless of gender. ' 35 The court stated
that since it is biologically impossible for a man to give birth, the only
individuals affected by application of the Hyde Amendment on state-funded
medical services are pregnant women.36
The Hyde Amendment discriminates against pregnant women seeking
state-funded medically necessary abortions by requiring these women to show
medical necessity beyond the standard medical necessity required for other
medical services. 37 The Hyde Amendment requires a showing of rape, incest
or imminent danger to the life of the mother caused by her pregnancy in order
for a woman to attain approval for a federally-funded abortion. 38 To show
imminent danger under the Hyde Amendment, it is not sufficient for a woman
to show that she has a pre-existing condition that would aggravate and be
aggravated by her pregnancy and possibly take her life, rather a woman must
establish that her pregnancy was the cause of the imminent, almost inevitable
danger to her life.39 The same standard existed with the application of the
Hyde Amendment to state- funded abortions in Texas," therefore the
application of the Hyde Amendment discriminated against women and not
men based solely on sexual difference.
The court concluded that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is defined by Texas law (and the
federal government) as discrimination on the basis of sex and is prohibited by
both state and federal law.4 '
After deciding that Texas' denial of state-funded medically necessary
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 698.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 698.
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abortions to indigent pregnant women unlawfully discriminated on the basis
of sex, the court then asked if "physical characteristics require and thus excuse
that sex based distinction."4' 2 The court stated that it must strictly scrutinize the
statute unless the proponent of the law rebuts plaintiffs' ERA prima facie
claim by illustrating that "unique physical characteristics require different
43
treatment under the law.
The court refused to answer the question of whether women are men and
men are women, noting that the question had already been answered in
Texas. 44 However, the court rejected Texas' argument that because men
cannot give birth, the physical difference between men and women
necessitates the discrimination inflicted by the Hyde Amendment. 45 "If that
were the case, discrimination based on pregnancy would never constitute sex
discrimination, and we know from the cases and statutes that this not the
law., 46 To illustrate this point, the court discussed Finley v. State,47 which
explained why a Texas statute that made it impossible for a woman to commit
rape did not violate the Texas ERA.48 The Finley court, utilizing the "physical
characteristic exception," searched for a valid nexus between the sex-based
classification of the statute and the reasons why the legislature passed the
statute. 49 The Finley court concluded that the leading principle behind the
statute was to avert assaults of men against women, therefore "the different
characteristics of the sexes justified the sex-based definition of perpetrator in
the statute." 50
Here, the court employed the Finley holding to illustrate that not only must
Texas show how the sexes are different, 5' Texas must also elucidate how
"singling out" sex accomplishes the objectives of the statute in question. In
other words, it was not sufficient for Texas to state that only women are able
to get pregnant, but Texas additionally also had to assert "some explanation of
why the physical characteristics of pregnancyjustify or require different health
care treatment under the Medicaid law. 53

42. Id. at 699.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Mercer, 538 S.W. 2d at 206. with a direct quote, "For us to adjudicate that women are
men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us
to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.").
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 527 S.W.2d 553 (TEX. CmiM. APP. 1975).
48. Low-Income Women of Tex. 38 S.W.3d at 700 (discussing Finley, 527 S.W.2d at 555).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The court noted that the purpose of the Medicaid law is to provide quality
health care to indigent persons.54 The court stated that the effect of Texas'
application of the Hyde Amendment to its state-funded medical services cuts
off a statutorily protected group of people from exercising their rights to
adequate, quality medical care under the Medicaid statute.55 The court did not
find a valid nexus between the sex-based distinction (of the Hyde Amendment)
and the purpose of the Medicaid statute.56 But, the court did find that the
restrictions contained in the Hyde Amendment could be deleterious to
women's health.5 7 In the court's view, the Hyde Amendment actually worked
in opposition to the original purpose of the Medicaid law, that is, to provide
quality medical care to indigent citizens.58 By requiring a showing of rape,
incest or imminent danger to the mother, the Hyde Amendment deprived poor
women with pre-existing medical condition the care to which they are entitled
under the Medicaid law and the Texas ERA.59
Through its strict scrutiny analysis, the court rejected Texas' argument that
the state "has a legitimate state interest in protecting both fetal and maternal
health." The court, relying on previous case law 60 , reminded Texas that "the
state may impose regulations on abortion only to protect the health of the
The court explained that the state
mother, not to protect the unborn fetus. ,,61
does not possess an interest in the fetus until it is viable.62 The court
repeatedly repudiated Texas' application of the Hyde Amendment as being
antithetical to the purpose of the Medicaid law and noted that less restrictive
Texas ' compelling interest in its citizens'
measures were available to further
63
conservatism.
fiscal
and
health
The Court of Appeals of Texas held Texas' application of the Hyde
Amendment to be unconstitutional because sex-based discrimination under the
Texas ERA is prohibited and, consequently, subject to strict judicial scrutiny
as to whether compelling state interests exist to validate the facially
unconstitutional law. The court found the Hyde Amendment, as applied to
Texas law, deprives indigent pregnant women of their right to the state-funded
medically necessary health service of abortion.'
54. Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(1992)).
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.at701.
Id.at700.
Id.
Id. at701 (citing Roe v. Wade, 4 10 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v.Casey, 505 U.S. 833
Id.
Id.
Id.at702.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
A woman's positive right 65 to legalized abortion access is unlike any other
civil liberty. No other civil liberty involves the substantive right to
purposefully terminate a potential human life.66 Furthermore, no other civil
liberty belongs solely to women or solely to men. The right to legalized
abortion access, because of its female specificity, is from its very inception
unique and anomalous.
Notwithstanding the particularly unique nature of abortion access rights,
courts continue to employ traditional interpretation mechanisms to determine
Traditional
the right to publicly-funded non-therapeutic abortions.
interpretation mechanisms simply do not work, because, after all, a woman's
right to legalized abortion access is not a traditional civil right.
If not traditional interpretation (of strict scrutiny analysis), then what
interpretation mechanism should the court have used in this situation? Such
a question will remain unanswered in this conclusion because the answer
involves more detail, discussion and politics than are appropriate for this case.
Nevertheless, food for thought is appropriate in this context. While this case
might be lauded by women's rights activists as a step in the right direction,
those same activists should consider the chilling effect of this decision. When
the Texas legislature enacted the equal rights amendment, did it consider that
Texas would have to pay for every Medicaid-eligible woman's abortion? Did
the Texas legislature intend to make abortion available as birth control?
Probably not. What effect will such a broad interpretation have on the other
state legislatures as they contemplate enacting their own equal rights
amendments?
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Erika Davis

65. A positive right is a right to something rather than a rightfrom something.
66. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).

